American Oil Investors\u27 Access to Dosmestic Courts in Foreign Nationalization Disputes by Editors,
COMMENT
AMERICAN OIL INVESTORS' ACCESS TO DOMESTIC
COURTS IN FOREIGN NATIONALIZATION DISPUTES
The right of a foreign sovereign to nationalize property lo-
cated within its borders is no longer seriously questioned, even
though its actions may have enormous impact on the individual
investor and his native country.' Generally accepted interna-
tional law has, however, imposed certain limitations upon the
free exercise of the state's power when the interests of aliens are
affected adversely. 2 In recent years, interest has focused on the
issues raised by foreign expropriation3 as a result of nationaliza-
tion, both actual and threatened, of the enormous oil deposits in
many resource-rich countries.
Nationalization of foreign crude oil produlting facilities has
occurred with limited frequency throughout the world since the
1950's.4 Today, the threat of future nationalizations on a more
extensive scale has become an imminent fear of the major oil
investors.5 In the Middle East, for example, the embargo on oil
shipments to the United States instituted following the October
1973 Arab-Israeli war 6 reemphasized the growing determination
of oil-rich countries to assert increasing control over their
natural resources. Dominion over oil deposits has, in fact, be-
come an increasingly important political priority for the leaders
of many Arab countries.
7
I The partial nationalization of Aramco interests in Saudi Arabia, for example, was
alone sufficient to account for the entire decline of $2.5 billion in the real United States
gross national product for the second quarter of 1974. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1974, at 33,
col. 1.
2 For a discussion of the restrictions on the sovereign's power to nationalize, see
Vicuna, Some International Law Problems Posed by the Nationalization of the Copper Industry by
Chile, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 711 (1973).
3 "Expropriation" and "nationalization" will be used interchangeably in this Com-
ment. For slight technical differences, see id. 719-21.
4 See, e.g., A. FORD, THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL DISPUTE OF 1951-52 (1954); NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 7, 1974, at 18; TIME, Nov. 19, 1973, at 88; Wall StreetJ., June 12, 1973, at 17, col. 1.
5 See, e.g., OIL & GAS J., Sept. 17, 1973, at 46 (example of fears in one uniquely
militant Arab state); cf. BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 2, 1974, at 50.
6 N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
7J. CAMPBELL & H. CARUSO, THE WEST AND THE MIDDLE EAST 45-52 (1972); F.
ROUHANI, A HISTORY OF O.P.E.C. 3-28 (1971); Bergsten, The Threat Is Real, 14 FOREIGN
POLICY 84 (1974); Breckenfeld, How the Arabs Changed the Oil Business, FORTUNE, Aug.
1971, at 113. Such aspirations are also shared by the leaders of oil- and mineral-wealthy
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Of course, not all nationalizations of private property violate
international private or public law, the law of the nationalizing
state, or the laws of the investor's domicile. Many nationaliza-
tions occur, in fact, pursuant to a mutual agreement for prompt
and adequate compensation reached prior to or immediately fol-
lowing the , action." Other nationalizations of foreign-owned
property are, however, in contravention of material terms of
contractual agreements between the expropriating state and the
foreign investors, or in violation of the applicable domestic laws
or of recognized principles of international law.
Where such illegal nationalizations have occurred, political
remedies available through the diplomatic machinery have been
the dominant, if not exclusive, method of conflict resolution be-
tween the investor's government and the expropriating sover-
eign.9 To aid the investors themselves, semi-public and public
insurance programs 0 have been authorized by Congress to pro-
tect American-owned foreign investment from the risks of
expropriation." Private negotiation between the investor and
the expropriating sovereign, with only limited direct involve-
ment or none at all by the American government, has also led to
at least temporary resolution and satisfaction of some investor
claims following expropriations of substantial property
interests. 12
nations in other parts of the world. See Leigh, Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Investment, in
SYMPOSIUM: PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 197 (V. Cameron ed. 1972); Levy, Oil Power,
49 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 652 (1971). For example, the President of Venezuela-the world's
third leading oil exporter followng Saudi Arabia and Iran-recently announced that an
early take-over of foreign oil property is a "certainty." N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1974, at 12,
col. 3.8 See, e.g., I. FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION: A STUDY IN THE PROTECTION OF ALIEN
PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1957); G. WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN
PROPERTY (1961); B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959). In
the case of Venezuela, it is clear that every effort has been made to assure an orderly
process of nationalization. OIL & GAS J., Aug. 26, 1974, at 63-64.
9
See R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 167 (1965); G. WHITE,
supra note 8, at 265-69.
10 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-95 (1970) (investment insurance). See H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 351-58 (1968). See also R. LILLICH, supra note 9,
at 147-64.
11 These insurance programs do not, for the most part, provide insurance for in-
vestment protection in the Middle East. Iran is the exception to the rule; insurance is
available there on a project-by-project basis. Egypt may become eligible but is presently
ineligible. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Country List (Investment Insurance and
Finance Program), Nov. 1, 1973. An amendment to the bill extending the OPIC for three
years, which would have prohibited OPIC protection for foreign oil investments, was
recently defeated in the House of Representatives. 120 CONG. REC. 43,946 (daily ed. May
16, 1974).
2 An example of partial government intervention is the Brazilian seizure of certain
International Telephone and Telegraph Company telephone lines and facilities, which
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Although not often pursued because of numerous historical
complexities, another avenue of redress for an aggrieved Ameri-
can investor is in access to the judicial apparatus. This Comment
will explore the present and potential role of American courts as
a forum for the resolution of conflicts and satisfaction of claims
arising out of the rapidly increasing number of expropriations.
It focuses in particular on the expanding role of American
courts in providing a meaningful system of remedies for private
investors who seek to challenge nationalizations of oil producing
and refining facilities, particularly by Middle Eastern sover-
eigns. 13 It is a case study of the progress to date in what one
authority has labeled "the effort in certain capital exporting
countries to create limited judicial remedies which would serve
to bolster the customary international law."' 14 However, before
examining the implications of increased access to judicial re-
medies, it is necessary to understand the underlying character of
the relationship between the American oil investor and the
foreign state.
I. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
A. The Relationship of Contractual and Property Rights
The unique legal element of the foreign oil exploration and
exportation industry is the "concession agreement," the legal
document through which foreign private investors have tradi-
tionally gained access to the natural resources of foreign lands.
Under the usual long term concession agreement, a foreign in-
vestor or a consortium of foreign investors acquires exclusive
rights of exploration, extraction, transportation, storage, utiliza-
tion, and exportation over extensive areas and all the crude oil
discovered and produced in those areas during the term of the
agreement. 15 This bundle of contractual rights granted from the
led to personal conversations between Presidents Kennedy and Goulart, followed by an
agreement reached pursuant to negotiations between Brazil and ITT. See H. STEINER &
D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 338-41. A recent example of purely private negotiation with
new government following removal by coup d'itat of the expropriating government is the
Cerro Corporation's compensation agreement for $41.8 million in cash and notes with
the government of Chile for the 1971 expropriation of the Rio Blanco copper mine, of
which Cerro was 70% owner. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1974, at 53, col. 3. For an example of
private negotiations leading to results deemed unsatisfactory to the foreign investor, see
OIL & GAS J., Nov. 5, 1973, at 34; PETROLEUM PRESS SERV., July 1973, at 244.
13 For a more limited focus by way of example on related issues, see Lowenfeld, Act
of State and Department of State: First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 AM. J.
INT'L L., 795, 806-10 (1972).
14 Leigh, supra note 7, at 197.
'" See, e.g., H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 371; Note, From Concession to
Participation: Restructuring the Middle East Oil Industry, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 774, 776-77
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public domain to the private investor represents the most sub-
stantial portion of the property interest sought to be protected
against nationalization. Because of the desire of the developing
Arab societies to attract foreign investors at a time when the
potential return was unfathomed, these agreements were origi-
nally written and sold under terms which, at least with the
benefit of hindsight, were extremely favorable to the private
parties.16 The host country received no ownership interest in the
oil to be produced. Compensation tended to be in the form of a
package containing an "up front" cash bonus, rents, royalties,
and a reserved right to a small percentage of the oil produced
for meeting the domestic energy needs of the host.'
7
More recent changes in bargaining conditions, specifically
the progressive decline of "the bargaining power of the capital
exporting countries ... as the gap between supply and demand
for oil was widened,"' 8 have produced modifications in the terms
of the original agreements 9 but not, for the most part, in the
underlying institutional relationships between the companies
and the governments.
The first of these major changes in the traditional legal
structure was effectuated on January 3, 1973, when four Persian
Gulf oil producing states, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi
Arabia, entered into new "participation" agreements with their
concessionaires significantly amending and reforming the terms
of their former concession agreements. Under the new agree-
ments, the four states, for the first time, each acquired an im-
mediate twenty-five percent ownership interest in the major con-
cessions within their areas, along with a degree of local corpo-
rate control and a planned graduated increase in their owner-
ship interest up to fifty-one percent by 1982.20 The agreements
have been further modified in light of the 1973 energy crisis,
with Kuwait's ownership interest, for example, already having
reached sixty percent. The other countries are negotiating for an
immediate increase to an even larger share.
2'
(1973). See also H. CATTAN, THE LAW OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA 19-27 (1967).
16 See, e.g., Am. Soc'Y OF INT'L L., 1967 PROCEEDINGS 81-84 (1967); Note, supra note
15, at 776 nn.4 & 5, 777.
7 See, e.g., H. CATTAN, supra note 15, at 27-42; Note, supra note 15, at 776-77.
18 Leigh, supra note 7, at 244.
19 The Comment makes no reference to the changing pricing and marketing rela-
tionships between Western concessionaires and the Arab states. See generally M. ADELMAN,
THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET (1972).
20 For a detailed analysis of these new agreements, see Note, supra note 15.
21 OIL & GAS J., June 17, 1974, at 18. See also N.Y. Times, June 13, 1974, at 65, col.
3; id. June 11, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
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But even with the substantial modification of the terms of
these agreements, the basic contractual relationship between the
foreign sovereign and the oil investors has remained largely un-
affected. The legal character of the oil concession has been de-
scribed as a "State contract which is sui generis" and which "can
be said to combine elements of private and public law which are
knitted together to create a relationship intended to exploit a
State resource for the mutual benefit of the parties. ' 22 Perhaps
the most thorough judicial review of the essential legal character
of concession agreements is to be found in the Saudi Arabia v.
Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),23 involving the reach of that
concession agreement to protect the concessionaires' exclusive
right of transport. The international arbitration tribunal rejected
Saudi Arabia's characterization of the concession agreement as a
state law and concluded:
In its capacity as first concessionaire, Aramco en-
joys indeed exclusive rights which have the character of
acquired or "vested" rights and which cannot be taken
away from it by the Government .... The principle of
respect for acquired rights is one of the fundamental
principles both of public international law and of the
municipal law of most civilized States....
In the Hanbali school of Islamic law, respect for
previously acquired private rights, and especiallyfor con-
tractual rights, is a principle just as fundamental as it is in
other legal systems of civilized States.
This follows from the fact that valid contracts bind
both parties and must be performed, for rights result-
ing from agreements concluded for due consideration
are absolutely secure ....
Since Aramco's Concession is a concession for the
development of national wealth, which is contractual in
character, and not a public service concession, the rights
and obligations of the concessionary Company are in
the nature of acquired rights and cannot be modified by
the granting State without the Company's consent.
24
Contractual characteristics of the newer participation agree-
ments are equally clear. Both agreements create a contractual
22 H. CATTAN, supra note 15, at 30.
23 27 INT'L L. REP. 117 (Arbitration Tribunal 1958).
24 Id. 205-06, 227 (emphasis added).
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bond between the investor and the host state with vested rights
in the investor for the term of the agreement.
With the concession agreement representing the most sig-
nificant part of the investors' property rights, the ownership of
the physical investments represents the balance. These invest-
ments include wells, storage tanks, pipelines, ports, and other
incidentals such as housing and office facilities. This investment
can represent huge monetary sums. For example, the net value
in 1971 of the physical assets of Aramco (the largest Arabian
concessionaire) was estimated at $1.266 billion. The relationship
between the value of assets and the remaining income potential
from the value of the oil in the concession area varies with con-
cessions, but the case of Aramco serves to illustrate that even the
staggering value of physical assets (property) is dwarfed by the
value of the crude oil underlying the concession contract. In just
one year, 1973, income from the concessions was sufficient for
Aramco to pay the Saudi Arabian government $7.6 billion in oil
revenues and income taxes.
2 5
B. The Effect of Nationalization
In addition to changes in the terms of the underlying con-
tracts between the corporations and the state, the change in bar-
gaining conditions has led, in such nations as Libya and Algeria,
to full nationalization of certain smaller oil companies' interests26
and to nationalization of fifty-one percent of the crude produc-
tion and assets of the major oil companies.27 It has also led in
certain contexts to absolute denials of the validity of the underly-
ing concession agreements.28 When nationalizations occur, the
form and reach of the decrees may thus differ. One may reach a
25 Mosely, The Richest Oil Company in the World, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1974, § 6
(Magazine), at 22. Detailed statistical ratios may be found in M. ADELMAN, supra note 19.
26 Wall Street J., June 12, 1973, at 17, col. 1 (quoting Libyan leader Muammar
el-Qaddafi after nationalization of the Bunker Hunt concession to Sarir oil field: "The
right to nationalize comes under our sovereignty over our land. We can do whatever we
want with our oil.").
27 OIL & GAS J., Sept. 10, 1973, at 44 (reporting all major oil companies' assets
nationalized in Libya to 51%); High Stakes in Libya, PETROLEUM PRESS SERV., July 1973, at
244. For an argument that nationalization may not be in the interest of some Arab
countries, such as Iran (where it failed in the early 1950's) and Saudi Arabia, see A.
FORD, supra note 4; Note, supra note 15, at 781, 788-90.
28 In the recent "participation" negotiations, for example, the Persian Gulf states
argued that the principle of rebus sic stantibus was applicable to the concessions. This
principle of international law states that if the relations between the parties, or circum-
stances relevant to a treaty, change substantially, one party may declare the treaty at an
end. Note, supra note 15, at 796.
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virgin field and the underlying concession agreement only;29
another may reach both the rights covered by the concession
agreement and the physical assets of the investors involved, but
only to a set percentage of production (say, fifty-one percent).
Total nationalization is a third possibility. 30 For example, the
June 11, 1973 Libyan nationalization of Nelson Bunker Hunt's
fifty percent interest in the Sarir oil field followed the earlier
nationalization in 1971 of British Petroleum's fifty percent share
of the field.31 The Hunt nationalization, as summarized by
Libya's Revolutionary Command Council in the nationalization
statute, illustrates the impact of total nationalization:
The rights ...under Concession Agreement No.
65 shall be nationalized and the ownership of all funds,
rights, assets and shares of Milton [sic] Bunker Hunt
related to the said concession agreement shall be turned
over to the State. This particularly includes all the rights
related to the installations and facilities for explora-
tory drilling, the extraction of oil and gas, and trans-
portation, utilization, refining, storage, exportation and
other assets and rights related to the said concession
agreement.
32
The day after the nationalization, Hunt declared that he did not
have "any choice but 'to pursue all available legal remedies.' 33
The remainder of this Comment will examine the probable suc-
29 See Lowenfeld, supra note 13, at 809-10 n.60 (example of Iraqi nationalization of
1961).
30 For example, see 13 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 60 (1974) for the September 1, 1973
Libyan decree nationalizing the interests of Exxon Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation,
Texaco Incorporated, Chevron, and Royal Dutch Shell. For subsequent nationalization of
the remaining 49% interests of some of the above corporations, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 31,
1974, § 1, at 46, col. 5.
31 Law of Dec. 7, 1971, Nationalizing British Petroleum Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd.,
11 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 380 (1972) (Libya) (unofficial transl.). On Oct. 11, 1973, Judge
Gunnar Lagergren of the Swedish Court of Appeal, an arbitrator appointed by the
International Court of Justice at the request of British Petroleum, declared that the
Libyan nationalization violated both the concession agreement and international law.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1973, at 50, col. 5. The opinion is not yet reported.
Following the ruling favorable to British Petroleum, the Libyan government commit-
tee, formed to determine the amount of compensation, offered BP $96.5 million from
which an unspecified amount of taxes and royalties would be deducted. BP has no
representation on the committee. The company's valuation of its seized property is in
excess of $250 million. OIL & GAS J., Nov. 5, 1973, at 34. BP and Libya recently reached
an agreement on the compensation to be paid for the nationalization. Wall StreetJ., Nov.
22, 1974, at 15, col. 2.
32 Law of June 11, 1973, Nationalizing Bunker Hunt Interest in Concession No. 65,
13 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 58 (1974) (Libya) (unofficial transl.).
33 Wall Street J., June 12, 1973, at 17, col. 1.
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cess of such efforts to obtain compensation within the judicial
system.
II. ACCESS TO THE JUDICIARY
A. The Act of State Doctrine and a Limited Legislative Response
Since the Supreme Court's formulation of the "act of state
doctrine" near the turn of the century in Underhill v. Her-
nandez,34 the courts of the United States have consistently re-
fused to "sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another [country] done within its own territory. '3 5 "Redress of
grievances," in the words of the Underhill court, were properly to
"be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
36
Even into the twentieth century, the Court continued to
adhere to its view that involvement in foreign expropriation is
reserved to the executive and not .a proper subject for the
judiciary. In 1964, the Court reached its high water mark in
judicial conservatism. It proclaimed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino37 that "the [j]udicial [b]ranch will not examine the va-
lidity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign
sovereign government ...in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles,
even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law."
38
Apparently dissatisfied with the Court's handsoff policy,
Congress enacted an amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance
Act in 1964. The amendment legislatively opened access to the
courts in a limited number of cases which would otherwise have
been barred by the Underhill and Sabbatino rule.39 Under the
statute, there are essentially two factual contexts in which the
''act of state doctrine" will not bar examination of the validity of
34 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
35 Id. at 252.
36 Id. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-37 (1964); Hen-
kin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805
(1964); Metzger, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23 U. PiTT. L. RFv. 881
(1962); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959); Annot., 12 A.L.R.
FED. 707 (1972).
37 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
38 Id. at 428.
39 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). This "Second Hickenlooper Amendment," known
as the Sabbatino Amendment, was passed by Congress in direct response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Sabbatino.
The legislation withstood constitutional challenge in 1967 on the grounds that appli-
cation of the amendment did not deprive a Cuban agency of property without due
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a foreign sovereign's taking. The first is the classical case in
which the amendment applies directly: property expropriated
without just compensation is sold by the expropriating nation to
a third party who attempts to market the identifiable property in
the United States, and the original owner discovers the property
and brings suit to replevy it. Second, even if the underlying
property is not found in the United States, the amendment ap-
plies to identifiable, traceable proceeds from the sale of alleg-
edly expropriated property if the proceeds are located in this
country.40 In these two situations, the statute requires that
no court in the United States shall decline on the
ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
determination on the merits giving effect to the princi-
ples of international law in a case in which a claim of
title or other rights to property is asserted . . . based
upon or traced through a confiscation or other taking
... by an act of that state in violation of the principles
of international law, including the principles of com-
pensation .... 41
The amendment is expressly not applicable "in any case with
respect to which the President determines that application of the
act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the
foreign policy interests of the United Stdtes and a suggestion to
this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court."
42
This critical aspect of the legislative reaction to the Supreme
Court's jurisdictional bar43 is succintly summarized in the Senate
Report:
The effect of the amendment is to achieve a rever-
sal of presumptions. Under the Sabbatino decision, the
courts would presume that any adjudication as to the
lawfulness under international law of the act of a
process and that the amendment was not a legislative interference with judicial and
executive power. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 174-83 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
41 See Mazaroff, An Evaluation of the Sabbatino Amendment as a Legislative Guardian of
American Private Investment Abroad, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 788, 804-09 (1969).
41 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
4 2 Id. If the only precedent to date is followed, this may involve a two-step process in
which executive silence during the litigation may not be sufficient. In the lower court
opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), Judge
Bryan first decided the case, then allowed a sixty-day stay for executive intervention.
With no intervention having occurred, the court dismissed the complaint. 272 F. Supp.
836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
4 See notes 34-38 supra & accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of the
Sabbatino decision and its progeny, see R. FALK, THE AFrERMATH OF SABBATINO (1965).
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foreign state would embarrass the conduct of foreign
policy unless the President says it would not. Under the
amendment, the Court would presume that it may pro-
ceed with an adjudication on the merits unless the Pres-
ident states officially that such an adjudication in the
particular case would embarrass the conduct of foreign
policy.
4 4
However, it is not Presidential intervention but narrow judicial
interpretation of the statutory words "claim of title or other
rights to property" which has resulted in the statute's being ap-
plied in only one case.
45
Thus, the Sabbatino Amendment offers a potential
remedy-though a narrow and limited one-for the oil conces-
sionaire whose interests have been nationalized. It allows a pos-
sessory action in the nature of replevin for return of seized oil
44 S. REP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964).
45 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
956 (1968), aff'g 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See Mazaroff, supra note 40. In
essence, the courts which have addressed the problem have concluded that the Sabbatino
Amendment was intended to exclude all contract claims. For example, in Menendez v.
Saks Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974) (No. 73-1288), the Second Circuit reaf-
firmed a prior narrow reading of the statute by holding that the amendment, especially
in its 1965 version, was intended to exclude all contract claims. The opinion emphasized
the 1965 modification of the amendment which added the words "to property" after
"other rights." 485 F.2d at 1272. The court cited the earlier decision of the New York
court of appeals in French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704,
295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968), holding both that a claim for a breach of contract is not a
"claim of title or other right to property" within the meaning of the amendment and that
the repudiation of a contractual obligation does not amount to a "confiscation or taking"
as those terms are used within the statute. The French court asserted:
It is plain enough upon the face of the statute-and abundantly clear
from its legislative history-that Congress was not attempting to assure a
remedy in American Courts for every kind of monetary loss resulting from
actions, even unjust actions, of foreign governments. The law is restricted,
manifestly, to the kind of problem exemplified by the Sabbatino case itself, a
claim of title or other right to specific property which had been expropriated
abroad.
Id. at 57-58, 242 N.E.2d at 712, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 444-45.
A recent decision from the District Court for the Central District of California,
factually distinguishable because of its antitrust implications but otherwise analagous, also
affirmed this view. Judge Pregerson concluded that the exception to the act of state
doctrine embodied in the Sabbatino Amendment "is by its terms extremely narrow ....
Plaintiff's assertion that the Amendment in effect pulled the rug out from under the act
of state doctrine in all cases is groundless." Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas &
Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 112 (C.D. Cal. 1971), afj'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972). See also 110 CONG. REC. 19,559 (1964) (remarks of Senator Hicken-
looper); id. 23,680 (1964) (remarks of Congressman Adair); Hearings on a Draft Bill to
Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess. 607, 1235, 1247 (1965).
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which may be shipped to the United States either by a third
party purchaser or by an instrumentality of the expropriating
state.46 However, since the concession agreements and the suc-
cessor participation agreements are essentially contracts, 47 any
claim sounding in breach or repudiation would fail to come
within the strict terms of the amendment. This is the conclusion
reached by the Second Circuit:
[A] claim for a breach of contract is not a "claim of title
or other right to property" within the meaning of the
Hickenlooper [Sabbatino] Amendment and the repudi-
ation of a contractual obligation does not amount to a
"confiscation or other taking" as those terms are used in
the statute. . . [W]e are persuaded by the legislative
history, and particularly by Congress' insertion in 1965
of the phrase "claim of title or other right," that the
intent was to exclude all contract claims from the
amendment.48
For purposes of Sabbatino Amendment jurisdiction in the
concession agreement context, it is therefore critical to deter-
mine the portion of the oil to which the concessionaire had a
"title right," as opposed to a mere contract right, at the time of
nationalization. Although the issue has never been explored in
an American court, it has arisen in foreign jurisdictions. Looking
to the law of the nationalizing state, courts in Japan
49 and Italy5°
have held that at most the concessionaire may assert a claim of
title to oil above ground, already extracted, at the moment of the
nationalization decree. 51 In certain instances the decision is
46 See text accompanying note 40 supra.
47 See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
48 Menendez v. Saks Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974) (No. 73-1288).
49 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, [1953] I.L.R. 305
(High Court, Tokyo, First Civil Affairs Section 1953).
50 British Petroleum Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Astro Protector Compania Naviera,
13 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 106 (1974) (Civ. Ct., Syracuse, Feb. 15, 1973) (petitioner's transl.);
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., [1955] I.L.R. 23 (Civ. Ct., Rome 1954).
51 However, a Singapore court gave a concessionaire title when oil was extracted by
the occupying Japanese army and subsequently seized by the British as war booty.
Whyatt, C.J., reasoned:
[T]he oil in the reservoirs was under the control of the appellants
[concessionaires] to the extent that it was capable of being under control and
they were in fact dealing with it was fully and completely as any owner could
deal with oil trapped in an underground reservoir. Accordingly I reach the
conclusion that the appellants were in actual possession of the oil in the reser-
voirs at the time of the Japanese invasion.
N.V. de Bataafshe Petroleum Maatschappij v. War Damage Comm'n, [1956] I.L.R. 810,
818 (Ct. App., Singapore 1956).
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based on the common law of the state; 52 more recently, courts
have relied on statutes.
The latter trend is evidenced by the 1973 British Petroleum
decision. 53 The case involved the attachment by BP of oil ship-
ped to Italy from its nationalized Sarir field in Libya by a third
party purchaser. The court rejected BP's claim to the oil, conced-
ing that it had been extracted from the Sarir field but conclud-
ing that it had been extracted not by BP but by the successor
Libyan company. The court supported its holding by reference
to Libyan statutory law:
Article 812, sub-paragraph 2, of the Libyan Civil
Code, provides that the ownership of the land includes
the space above and below the sub-soil, so that it may be
usefully enjoyed above and below, subject as provided
by the special legislation regarding quarries and mines.
Such rule must, however, be read in conjunction
with that of Article 1 of the Libyan Petroleum Law No.
25 of 12/4/1955, by virtue of which all petroleum lying
in the Libyan subsoil in its natural state is deemed to be
property of the Libyan state . . .54
The Italian court thus concluded that the bundle of concession
rights allowed BP "to acquire the ['property'] ownership of the
crude oil only at the time of extraction. ' 55 All other interests were
contractual in nature.
The Sabbatino Amendment's failure to reach contractual
claims thus severely limits its value as a vehicle of access to the
domestic courts. Moreover, even with respect to above-ground
crude oil, the concessionaire would likely face numerous chal-
52 See, e.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., [1955] I.L.R. 23, 45 (Civ. Ct.,
Rome 1954):
Consequently, in accordance with the Persian legal system, in view of the
non-autonomous nature of the minerals before extraction ... it is clear that
the holder of the Concession cannot acquire the ownership of such mineral
products prior to their extraction. Prior to extraction, the ownership of the
mineral (a future commodity, not yet in existence, and not a fruit) was vested
in the owner of the mine, in respect of which the holder of the Concession had
a merejus adquirendi, which could be converted into a right of ownership only
by the exercise of the right of extraction and acquisition granted to the said
Company.
53 British Petroleum Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Astro Protector Compania Naviera,
13 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 106 (1974) (Civ. Ct., Syracuse, Feb. 15, 1973) (petitioner's transl.).
The case is now on appeal. High Stakes in Libya, PETROLEUM PRESS SERV., July 1973, at
244. Another hearing on oil shipped from BP's nationalized Libyan fields is scheduled in
Athens before a Greek court, but no decision has yet been reported.
-4 12 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 113.
55 1d. 114.
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lenges based on legislative ambiguities before a claim of title to
seized oil would be allowed by an American court. For example,
the amendment allows the courts to make a determination only
in cases in which the "act of that state [is] in violation of the
principles of international law, including the principles of com-
pensation .... *"56 Does this reference to "compensation" mean
that Congress wanted to confine the inquiry to questions relating
to the adequacy or existence of compensation under interna-
tional law? Commentators have argued against such a restrictive
reading.5 7 A broader international law standard would allow
concessionaires to argue that the seizure is in violation of inter-
national law "when the purpose for the seizure of the property is
to retaliate against the homeland of those aliens and when the
result of such seizure is to discriminate against them only."
'5 8
This is the position which Bunker Hunt has taken with respect to
its Sarir field:
This act of nationalization was publicly described
by the Libyan government as "a warning to the oil com-
panies to respond to the demands of the Libyan Arab
Republic" and "a warning to the United States to end
its recklessness and hostility to the Arab nation."
Thus, this action, which applied only to Hunt, was
clearly discrimatory, punitive, coercive in nature and
without a valid public purpose. As such it was a clear
violation of international law .... 59
56 22 U.S.C. § 23 7 0(e)(2) (1970).
57 Bleicher, The Sabbatino Amendment in Court: Bitter Fruit, 20 STAN. L. REV. 858
(1968), argues that the meaning of the word "including" in the Amendment should not
mean "conclusively defined as," but should be viewed as an illustrative reference, "added
to ensure that American courts will apply principles of international law in relation to
expropriation problems, even though they might feel it unwise to do so." Id. 862, 863. In
this way, judges could present their decisions as a "reasoned development of principles
endorsed by the international community." Id. 864. See also Mazaroff, supra note 40, at
794-97.
In the case of oil, concession nationalization decrees have, in fact, made specific
provision for at least a determination and extension of compensation. See, e.g., Law of
June 11, 1973, Nationalizing Bunker Hunt Interest in Concession No. 65, 13 INT'L LEG.
MAT'-Ls 58, 59 (1974) (Libya) (unofficial transl.).
58 This standard, in addition to the lack of adequate compensation, was adopted by
the Second Circuit in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 864 (2d Cir.
1962) (emphasis omitted). The standard was left undisturbed by the Supreme Court,
which argued, however, that international law is unsettled as to a minimum standard for
"valid" nationalizations. 376 U.S. 398, 428-30 (1964). It was again applied in the case's
final decision. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 393 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1966).
59 This statement is from a notice published by Bunker Hunt in major international
newspapers following nationalization of the field. See, e.g., Wall Street J., July 10, 1973, at
37, col. 3.
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The amendment further leaves unclear what standard of
compensation should be viewed as sufficient, that set forth in the
first Hickenlooper Amendment" or the less rigid, internation-
ally accepted standard requiring only "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation.
61
The other basic cloud over the significance of a Sabbatino
Amendment in rem action is the uncertainty with respect to
executive intervention. In the simplest terms, executive silence
allows the court to adjudicate the merits notwithstanding the act
of state doctrine. The executive, however, has the option of fil-
ing a suggestion with the court "in any case with respect to which
the President determines that application of the act of state doc-
trine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy
interests of the United States .... 62 In this way, the executive
may stop the court from asserting jurisdiction. In a diplomatic
context as delicate and tense as that arising out of the Middle
East, it is possible that the executive would exercise the option.
63
Another problem arises if the oil is shipped to the United
States by an instrumentality of the seizing state, rather than by
a third party: the seizing state may enter a defense of sovereign
immunity. 64 This defense allows the foreign sovereign to claim
an immunity similar to that held by the domestic sovereign.
65
The defense relates to the sovereign's right not to have itself or
60 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1970). The statute mentions "speedy compensation for (the
expropriated] property in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value
thereof, as required by international law ...."
For a discussion of utility of Hickenlooper 1 as a diplomatic weapon discouraging
nationalization of American-owned foreign investment, see Am. Soc'Y oF INT'L L., 1967
PROCEEDINGS 98-100 (1967).
" See Z. KRONFOL, PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 110-18 (1972).
62 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
63 Lowenfeld, supra note 13, at 803-10 (focusing on the "Sabbatino suggestions"
from the perspective of problems faced by the State Department). However, when the
oil from the Sarir field was offered for sale in this country, the State Department ap-
plied significant pressure on prospective buyers, suggesting that they could be held
liable in American courts. In a press release the Department said it "has declined to
block suits in American courts in pursuit of goods claimed to be hot. Its so declining is
clearly consistent with the will of the U.S. Congress ...." Statement of Department
of State, transmitted to Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, May 7, 1974 (reproduced in 13 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 767, 780 (1974)).
64 It has been held that the Sabbatino Amendment is restricted entirely to the act of
state doctrine. It thus deals only with cases in which there is no other bar to jurisdiction.
The amendment cannot, therefore, deny the foreign defendant its defense of sovereign
immunity. American Hawaiian Ventures, Inc. v. M.V.J. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622,
626 (D.N.J. 1966), noted in 8 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357 (1967).
63 As originally formulated, the foreign sovereign's immunity was presumed to be
given by the implicit consent of the domestic sovereign. The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Situations exist, however, in which such
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its instrumentalities subjected to the jurisdiction of the court,
rather than to its privilege not to have American courts question
its acts within its own territory. 66 The in rem jurisdiction previ-
ously acquired would have to be relinquished should the defense
be successful.
67
Mechanically, the seizing state would have the option of
seeking a suggestion of immunity from the State Department; if
it were successful, the courts would almost certainly honor the
suggestion. Predicting the State Department's probable response
to a request for a suggestion of immunity in this kind of case is,
however, a matter of political prognostication. As Judge Wisdom
noted in a recent Fifth Circuit decision,
the degree to which granting or denying a claim of
immunity may be important to foreign policy is a ques-
tion on which the judiciary is particularly ill-equipped to
second guess the executive .... [I]n the chess game that
is diplomacy only the executive has a view of the entire
board and an understanding of the relationship be-
tween isolated moves. Will granting immunity serve as a
bargaining counter in complex diplomatic negotiations?
. . . Will it preclude a significant diplomatic advance;
perhaps a detente between this country and one with
whom we are not on the best speaking terms? These are
questions for the executive, not the judiciary.
68
Because of the serious adverse effect that denial of immunity
may have on relations with the state seeking the suggestion,
the State Department has tended to grant it when it is re-
quested.
69
consent cannot be implied, and the defense is disfavored. See, e.g., National City Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
66 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438.(1964). That both doc-
trines have bases in comity of nations is apparent. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.). Until recent years, however, they
remained distinct doctrines relating respectively to jurisdiction and justiciability. Begin-
ning with Justice White's singular dissent in Sabbatino, a merger of the two has been
attempted, with the prominent role for the executive in granting or withholding immun-
ity extended to the area of act of state. In First National City Bank, Justice Rehnquist
explicitly drew on sovereign immunity cases for his reasoning, while Justice Douglas
applied Republic of China, a sovereign immunity case, without discussion of the implica-
tions.
67 See Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 1.03, 106 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
68 Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).
69
Cf. 13 INT'L LEG. MAT'IS 120 (1974) (reproducing documents underlying sugges-
tion of immunity in Spacil v. Crowe).
FOREIGN NATIONALIZATION DISPUTES
Notwithstanding Judge Wisdom's view, the executive is pre-
sently seeking to transfer to the courts the sole responsibility for
determining when immunity should be granted.7 0 The executive
could accomplish this by refusing to act on any request for a
suggestion. If no suggestion was then before the court, it would
weigh the issue of sovereign immunity de novo. In these con-
texts, there has been an increasing tendency within the Depart-
ment of State and in the courts to deny claims for sovereign
immunity for suits involving "commercial" activities of sov-
ereigns.7' On the other hand, the Second Circuit stated in Vic-
tory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria Genera7 2 that although the dis-
tinction between acts which are jure imperii (public acts of the
sovereign to be afforded immunity) and those which are jure
gestionis (commercial acts not to be afforded immunity) may not
be precisely defined, acts "such as nationalization" are, never-
theless, jure imperii. While there has been some disapproval of
this view among commentators, 73 no judicial opinion has chal-
lenged it.
Assuming that all of the jurisdictional bars may be overcome
and the aggrieved concessionaire is given his day in court, the
investor should still anticipate substantial procedural problems
and substantive defenses. With some careful planning, these may
be mitigated. For example, there is some question whether an
action to recover specific fungible property such as oil may be
maintained successfully.7 4 Related thereto is a problem of iden-
tification and tracing-was the oil in controversy extracted prior
to the expropriation and from fields to which the plaintiff had
7' The State Department has found that it cannot deny a claim of immunity
without risking adverse effects on foreign relations. Thus the Administration
has sought legislation transferring to the courts the responsibility for deter-
mining whether a claim of immunity should be honored. See H.R. 3493, 93d
Cong., 1 Sess. (1973). The bill would take the State Department out of the
business of suggesting immunity to the courts. Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before
the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1 Sess. 34 (1973).
489 F.2d at 620 n.7. See Note, Sovereign Immunity, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 157 (1974).
71 See, e.g., Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of United
States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 901 (1969).
72 336 F.2d 354, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
73 See Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment-International Law Meets Civil Procedure, 59
AM.J. INT'L L. 899, 906-07 (1965).
74 1d. 900 (raising the same question); see J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 192-96 (1972); ef. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716, Comment 2
(on the expanding availability of specific performance: "The test of uniqueness [required
for specific performance] ... must be made in terms of the total situation which charac-
terizes the contract. Output and requirements contracts involving a particular or pecu-
liarly available source or market present today the typical commercial specific perfor-
mance situation .... ").
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concession rights? The identification problem may be further
complicated if the oil properly within the Sabbatino Amend-
ment's reach is commingled with oil to which no "claim of title"
may be sustained by the concessionaire.
7 5
The third party may also seek to exert the "good faith
purchaser defense. '7 6 To combat this defense, wide notice of the
seizure and the concessionaire's claim of title to the oil affected
must be given the business community. Such notices have been
placed in newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal and the New
York Times.7 7 In the recent Bunker Hunt Libyan nationalization,
as in previous cases, such notices seem to have deterred market-
ing of any of the seized oil in the United States. Such notices
75 See Reeves, The Sabbatino Case and the Sabbatino Amendment: Comedy-or Tragedy-of
Errors, 20 VAND. L. REv. 429, 444 (1967).
76 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(i); J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 74,
at 940-43.
77 The Bunker Hunt notice as published in the Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1973, at
37, col. 3, read:
ANNOUNCEMENT BY NELSON BUNKER HUNT
Contrary to established principles of international law, the Libyan gov-
ernment on June 11, 1973, formally purported to nationalize the assets of
Nelson Bunker Hunt in relation to Concession 65 and the Sarir Field in Libya.
This followed a de facto expropriation on May 24, 1973.
This act of nationalization was publicly described by the Libyan govern-
ment as "a warning to the oil companies to respond to the demands of the
Libyan Arab Republic" and "a warning to the United States to end its reckless-
ness and hostility to the Arab nation."
Thus, this action, which applied only to Hunt, was clearly discriminatory,
punitive, coercive in nature and without a valid public purpose. As such it was
a clear violation of international law, the contractual obligations of the Libyan
government, and the arbitration proceedings presently pending between the
parties.
Hunt has protested to the Libyan government against the action and has
reminded that government that its unlawful acts are incapable of terminating
rights under the Concession.
In this time of energy shortages, it should be noted that the Libyan action
against Hunt and, earlier, against British Petroleum, has removed from legiti-
mate international commerce over 400,000 barrels of oil per day. Since Hunt
was the largest single exporter of low sulphur Libyan crude oil to the United
States, the burden of the Libyan action will be felt by the American people.
The attention of all those who may be concerned with these develop-
ments, whether as purchasers or sellers of oil, oil products or otherwise, is
drawn to the continuance of Hunt's rights. It is Hunt's intention to assert those
rights wherever and whenever necessary against those who infringe them,
including anyone dealing in or with oil extracted from the Sarir Field, its
products or proceeds. This warning applies equally to dealings in or with
so-called "royalty oil" or "cost crude oil", of which there is none. Legal title to
all oil from Sarir Field and Concession 65 rests in B.P. Exploration Company
(Libya) Ltd. and Nelson Bunker Hunt.
For another "notice," see N.Y. Times, May 3, 1972, at 73, col. 6 (by Basrah Petroleum
Co., Ltd.-a British company whose North Rumalia oil fields were nationalized by Iraq in
1961).
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should therefore be publicized quickly. In the Bunker Hunt
case, the company waited a full thirty days. Such a time gap
could have been fatal if a third party had bought the oil in the
interim.
The monetary recovery possible via the Sabbatino Amend-
ment exception to the act of state doctrine is limited, and the
procedure is clouded by a string of uncertainties. Nonetheless,
the availability of potential recourse to the courts and the risk of
incurring legal and storage costs while shipments of oil are tied
up pending resolution of the controversy serves as an effective
deterrent to the marketing of the seized oil in the United States.
The value of the remedy decreases, of course, as the demand for
oil continues to outstrip supply and competitive prices for the oil
are available worldwide. The failure of nationalized oil conces-
sionaires successfully to sustain suits attaching seized oil wher-
ever shipped has also undercut the potential deterrent value of
the remedy.78 Should foreign courts render decisions more
favorable to oil investors in the future, the value of the Sabbatino
Amendment as a deterrent to nationalization might improve,
although its value as a source of financial recovery would remain
insignificant in terms of the total investment.
7 9
B. First National City Bank and its Progeny
In contrast to the numerous obstacles confronting a litigant
proceeding under the Sabbatino Amendment, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in First National City Bank v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba80 may have signalled a new relationship between
the judiciary and the executive in the protection of the property
interests of Americans deleteriously affected by the acts of
foreign governments within their own territories. Emerging
78 The only successful attachment was in an English colonial court. Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), [1953] I.L.R. 316 (Aden Sup. Ct. 1953). But cf. Braden
Copper Co. v. Groupment d'Imporation des Metaux (Ct. of Extended Jurisdiction, Paris,
Nov. 29, 1972), 12 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 182, 189 (1973) (court orders Chilean corporation
to segregate proceeds of sale of copper shipped to France and produce them if a court-
appointed master finds that Chile has not equitably indemnified Braden, a subsidiary of
Kennecott Copper Company, for seized mines. Proceedings were later postponed. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1973, at 58, col. I).
79 See High Stakes in Libya, 40 PETROLEUM PRESS SERV., July 1973, at 244. For a recent
decision supportive of oil investor interests, see note 31 supra. See also text accompanying
note 25 supra.
80 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Hereinafter any reference without citation made to First
National City Bank will be to this second Supreme Court disposition of the case. The case
has a lengthy history: 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.
1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971), on remand, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406
U.S. 759 (1972), on remand, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
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court of appeals interpretations of the case's three opinions"'
support the view that access to judicial forums may have been
expanded by the decision to controversies previously barred by
the act of state doctrine.8 2 Paradoxically, the Court itself may, to
some extent, have accomplished through judicial intervention
what Congress failed to effect through legislative action.
In First National City Bank, the American bank loaned a pre-
decessor of Banco Nacional $15 million secured by United States
bonds. When the Castro government seized power in Cuba, all
of the branches of First National City were expropriated. First
National City sold the collateral bonds in response and was sued
by Banco Nacional for an alleged excess in principal and in-
terest. By way of setoff and counterclaim, First National City
asserted the right to collect damages as a result of losses sus-
tained in the nationalization. The lower court allowed the coun-
terclaim but was reversed by the Second Circuit. The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the court of ap-
peals to consider a letter filed on behalf of thq Department of
State recommending that the act of state doctrine not be applied.
Notwithstanding the views of the executive branch, the Second
Circuit adhered to its earlier determination. Again the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that when the executive "expressly rep-
resents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that
doctrine should not be applied by the courts.1
83
Prior to First National City Bank, the courts served as
"shields," reinforcing the primacy and exclusivity of the execu-
tive for redress of wrongs suffered by Americans at the hands of
sovereigns; 84 the courts' new role may be more amenable to
characterization as "swords" in the hands of the executive.8 5 The
extent to which the judiciary, by opening its doors to judicial
81 Justice Rehnquist delivered the judgment of the court, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White joined. Justices Douglas and Powell concurred only in the
result. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall,
and Blackmun.
82 See Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974) (No. 73-1288);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973). But see
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
83 406 U.S. at 768.
84 See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
8- See 406 U.S. at 789-90 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted):
Similarly, when the Judicial Branch has abided by an Executive determination
of foreign sovereignty, the consequence has been merely to require or deny
the application of various principles governing the attributes of sovereignty.
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relief, will in fact function as marshall to an executive 86 wishing
to deter foreign expropriation of American property is, how-
ever, far from settled. It nevertheless seems clear that First
National City Bank has created, in addition to the replevy
action available under the Sabbatino Amendment, 7 a second
category of cases in which the act of state doctrine will not bar
examination of the validity of a foreign sovereign's taking.
According to the Court, the doctrine may not be used as a
pre-emptive defense against a counterclaim for damages in
a case where the expropriating sovereign acts as plaintiff in
an American court seeking proceeds from the sale of the sov-
ereign's property properly within the possession of defendant
prior to the expropriation.
Critical, however, to the successful limitation on the act of
state doctrine in First National City Bank was the Court's reliance
... In no event has the judiciary necessarily been called upon to assess a claim
under international law. The effect of following a "Bernstein letter," of course,
is exactly the opposite-the Judicial Branch must reach a judgment despite the
possible absence of consensus on the applicable rules, the risk of irritation to
sensitive concerns of other countries, and the danger of impairment to the
conduct of foreign policy.
For an explanation of the origin of the "Bernstein letter" exception, see note 88 infra.
86 Commentators have generally criticized this evolution of executive "control" over
the judiciary, recognizing the court's lack of sensitivity to separation of powers and the
need for the court to define for itself what is a political question. They cite with approval
Justice Brennan's dissent in First National City Bank, which noted that "[t]he Executive
Branch, however extensive its powers in the area of foreign affairs, cannot by a simple
stipulation change a political question into a cognizable claim." 406 U.S. at 788-89. See,
e.g., Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference or Absention?, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82,
93 (1972) ("If there is a question of judicial deference involved in the act of state doctrine
it is a deference to the overriding policy of judicial abstention, not to Executive sugges-
tions.... [T]o construe the act of state doctrine as compelling such judicial deference to
political decisions would be to ignore the purpose of the doctrine in securing the separa-
tion of powers."); Lowenfeld, supra note 13, at 795 ("The objective of protecting overseas
private investments was not furthered; and the relation between the Executive Branch
and the Judiciary was pushed in the wrong direction."); Note, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note] ("If the Executive obtains unbridled discretion
to decide when a question involving foreign relations is within the competence of the
Judiciary, judicial independence is unavoidably compromised." Id. 142. "To revise our
governmental structure in favor of the relative monopoly of a single.branch in such a
broad area of societal interaction seems an unnecessary measure, and the Bernstein excep-
tion as enunciated by the Citibank [First National City Bank] Court represents an unwar-
ranted extension of Executive influence." Id. 144). See also Note, 3 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
PoLsc 117 (1973). Contra, Leigh, supra note 7, at 245 ("There appears to be less likeli-
hood than ever that political or economic sanctions will be employed to support the
security of investment or to promote fair settlements in expropriation cases. Under these
circumstances, judicial determination of title to movable property expropriated without
compensation in one country and sold in another, offers one of the few promising
possibilities for introducing a measure of badly needed stability in international commer-
cial and economic relations.").
'7 See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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on the intervention of the executive via a "Bernstein letter"88
from John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor to the Department of
State.8 9 The letter to the Supreme Court sitting in the case for
the first time 90 said that recent events91 had convinced the De-
partment that the "act of state doctrine" should not bar consid-
eration of a defensive counterclaim or offset when three condi-
tions exist: "(a) the foreign state's claim arises from a relationship
between the parties existing when the act of state occurred; (b)
the amount of relief to be granted is limited to the amount of the
foreign state's claim; and (c) the foreign policy interests of the
United States do not require application of the doctrine. ' 92 The
Stevenson letter concluded, "The Department of State believes
that the act of state doctrine should not be applied to bar consid-
eration of a defendant's counterclaim or set off against the Gov-
ernment of Cuba in this (First National City Bank) or like cases." '
With this background, it is important to understand the
positions of the five Justices comprising the majority. Because
he spoke for a plurality in rendering the judgment, Justice
Rehnquist's opinion is probably of greatest significance. Al-
though he recognized the Sabbatino Court's concern for the
"separation of powers" 94 and replied to the earlier, historically
11 The "Bernstein letter" exception to the act of state doctrine prior to First National
City Bank was allowed only in the cases of its origin. Two cases were involved: Bernstein v.
Van Heyghen Freres, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947), and
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). Both
cases involved attempts by the plaintiff, Bernstein, to attach insurance proceeds of prop-
erty owned by him but expropriated by the Nazi German government. In the first case
Judge Learned Hand held that the act of state doctrine precluded an examination of the
validity of the Nazi taking. In the second case counsel for Bernstein submitted a press
release from the Department of State which "relieve[d] American courts from any re-
straint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi
officials." Id. at 376. Thereupon the court of appeals held that the doctrine did not bar
consideration of the merits.
89 The text of the Stevenson letter is printed in the Second Circuit's second decision
in First National City Bank, 442 F.2d at 536-38.
90 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
91 One commentator on First National City Bank clarified this by saying: "The 'recent
events' referred to were apparently the increase in expropriations of assets of U.S. na-
tionals by foreign governments." Harvard Note, supra note 86, at 137 n.30.
9-2 442 F.2d at 537.
93 Id. at 538.
94 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964), Justice
Harlan wrote for the majority of eight:
If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on federal and
state courts alike but compelled by neither international law nor the Constitu-
tion, its continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper dis-
tribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Gov-
ernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.
Justice Rehnquist asserted in First National City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768, that the Court's
"holding is in no sense an abdication of the judicial function to the Executive Branch."
FOREIGN NATIONALIZATION DISPUTES
dominant concern with "international comity,"95 his opinion
set forth a new basis for application of the act of state doctrine
which removed the question of justiciability from the courts:
The act of state doctrine is grounded on judicial
concern that application of customary principles of
law to judge the acts of a foreign sovereign might frus-
trate the conduct of foreign relations by the political
branches of the government. We conclude that where
the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary re-
sponsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly
represents to the Court that application of the act of
state doctrine would not advance the interests of
American foreign policy, that doctrine should not be
applied by the courts. In so doing, we of course adopt
and approve the so-called Bernstein exception to the act
of state doctrine. We believe this to be no more than an
application of the classical common-law maxim that
"[t]he reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also
ceases" .... 96
Justice Powell's opinion went further. While seeking to pro-
tect to some degree the Sabbatino Court's concern with the sep-
aration of powers by expressly rejecting Bernstein per se,97 he
would reserve only a "pseudo discretion" in the courts. It is
pseudo because the potential denial of access turns only on a
concern that the judiciary will interfere with the conduct of deli-
cate foreign relations. This concern could not exist in any case in
which the court was in possession of a "Bernstein letter." Justice
Powell therefore appears to be much more a proponent in gen-
eral terms of extending the role of domestic courts in the adjudi-
cation of international law conflicts than is Justice Rehnquist. He
asserted:
I do not agree . . . that balancing the functions of the
judiciary and those of the political branches compels the
judiciary to eschew acting in all cases in which the un-
derlying issue is the validity of expropriation under cus-
tomary international law. Such a result would be an
abdication of the judiciary's responsibility to persons
who seek to resolve their grievances by judicial process.
. .. I am not prepared to say that international law
95 406 U.S. at 765-67.
96 Id. at 767-68 (citation omitted).
117 Id. at 773 (Powell. J.. concurring in the judgment).
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may never be determined and applied by the judiciary
where there has been an "act of state." Until interna-
tional tribunals command a wider constituency, the
courts of the various countries afford the best means
for the development of a respected body of interna-
tional law ....
Unless it appears that an exercise of jurisdiction
would interfere with delicate foreign relations con-
ducted by the political branches, I conclude that federal
courts have an obligation to hear cases such as this.98
Thus, four members of the Court no longer see the act of
state doctrine as an absolute bar to jurisdiction in American
courts. Joining these four, Justice Douglas would also approve
some relaxation in the inflexibility of the act of state doctrine.
However, the First National City Bank holding is more limited
because Justice Douglas' opinion,99 necessary to forge a majority,
relied solely on the counterclaim logic of National City Bank v.
Republic of China.100
Upon its second and final remand in First National City Bank,
the Second Circuit did not interpret the split opinions but noted
only that the Supreme Court decision had held that "the act of
state doctrine [does] not bar consideration of the merits."' 10 The
court of appeals then determined that the Cuban expropriation
of the bank's Havana branch violated international law and that
the bank's proceeds from the sale of Cuban collateral asserted as
a counterclaim could be retained.
The interesting question which now remains is whether the
lower federal courts will rely on the four Justices and extend the
First National City Bank holding beyond its factual limits, 10 2
thereby opening greater access to the courts. In order to forecast
with any assurance the future availability of United States
98 Id. at 774-76.
19 Id. at 770 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result). Justice Douglas' reasoning was
criticized by Justice Powell, id. at 774, where he asserted, "Although attracted by the
justness of the result he reaches, I find little support for MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS' theory
that the counterclaim is justiciable up to, but no further than, the point of set off."
100 348 U.S. 356 (1955). The Republic of China had commenced a suit against
National City Bank to recover deposits allegedly wrongfully withheld. The bank coun-
terclaimed against the government of the Republic. The government interposed a de-
fense of sovereign immunity. In an opinion for the Court, Justice Frankfurter held it
would be "unconscionable" to allow the Republic of China to invoke the jurisdiction of
the United States courts while invoking the preemptive defense of sovereign immunity to
fend off counterclaims.
101 478 F.2d 191, 192 (2d Cir. 1973).
102 For a discussion of the potential broad readings and extensions of the "Bernstein
letter" basis of the opinion, see Harvard Note, supra note 86, at 142.
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domestic courts to investors claiming an expropriation in viola-
tion of international law, the judicially denoted limits of the First
National City Bank exception to the act of state doctrine must be
sketched.
In affirming a lower court decision denying access to the
federal court on the basis of the act of state doctrine, the Ninth
Circuit asserted in a footnote that the First National City Bank
decision, which was decided during the pendency of the appeal
before it, "is limited to the facts of that case."'103 Although it is
arguable that the critical missing element in the factual pattern
presented to the Ninth Circuit was the lack of an affirmative
intervention by the executive, the court nonetheless seemed re-
luctant to apply the plurality position of First National City Bank
broadly.
On the other hand, in a recent Second Circuit case,
Menendez v. Saks Co. ,104 the holding in First National City Bank was
more liberally construed. The Menendez court held that an offset
in the form of counterclaim should be allowed where the
sovereign refused to return proceeds wrongfully received for
property sold prior to the expropriation.' 0 5 Proceeds from the
sale of similar property shipped to the United States after the
expropriation (cigars manufactured in Cuba) were held by a
New York collecting bank and claimed by the original owners.
The court directed the importers to pay the owners for pre-
expropriation shipments and directed the importers to pay the
intervenors (Cuba) for post-expropriation shipments, with in-
terest, subject to the offset in favor of the importers for pay-
ments mistakenly made to the intervenors. Because the counter-
claim was larger than the offset's amount, the offset was allowed
in full.
103 Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 461 F.2d 1261, 1261 n.1
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972), affg 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The
lower court decision is noted in 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 815 (1971); 3 DENVER J. INT'L L. &
Poucy 133 (1973); 7 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 247 (1972); 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 413 (1972); 5 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 251 (1971).
104 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974) (No. 73-1288).
105 The court held in Menendez that "accounts receivable" are generally not seized by
the state through nationalization, noting that the
act of state doctrine, which applies to a foreign state's seizure of property
located within its territory does not protect a foreign state's attempted seizure
of debts owed by persons outside of the foreign state's territory. For purposes
of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not located within a foreign state unless
that state has the power to enforce or collect it.
485 F.2d at 1364; see also, e.g., Tabacalera Severino Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392
F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 1027 (1966).
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It is important to note the critical ways in which the facts of
Menendez differed from those in First National City Bank. In
Menendez, the nationalized cigar factories were owned by Cuban
nationals who subsequently fled to the United States. It is settled
law that nationalization of property owned by subjects of the
sovereign is not a violation of international law.' 0 6 The act of
state being examined in Menendez was not, as it was in First Na-
tional City Bank, the taking itself, but Cuba's assertion that the
expropriation reached unpaid accounts receivable for cigars
shipped prior to expropriation and its refusal to return pay-
ments received therefrom. Thus, in refusing to apply the act of
state bar, the court indicated that First National City Bank applies
not only to the actual expropriation, but also to related actions
by the sovereign.
In addition, Menendez seems to have expanded First National
City Bank in certain other limited ways. First, Menendez
broadened the scope of executive intervention via a "Bernstein
letter" by applying it not only to the specific case before the
court but also to subsequent like cases. 10 7 In addition, this case
incorporates counterclaims for "unjust enrichment" (a quasi-
contractual type of claim) into the class of adjudicable claims.
10 8
Although it is the least clear, the third extension by the
Menendez court is potentially the most significant.109 It is possible
to read Menendez as extending the reach of First National City
Bank to allow access to domestic courts in cases questioning the
validity of acts of sovereigns even where the actions involved do
not violate international law.
The Menendez court held in relevant part that the Cuban
government's claim to the owners' accounts receivable as part of
the expropriation of the factory to which the accounts were due
was improper; that Cuba's refusal to reimburse the owners for
amounts paid the state by mistake for pre-expropriation ship-
ments was an act of state; and that the counterclaims for reim-
bursement were allowable up to the limit of Cuba's direct claim.
Because of the assumption that seizure of its own nationals'
106 See, e.g., F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
affd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
M07 There is a substantial question whether the Menendez case was in fact a like case.
This expansion is being challenged in Republic of Cuba v. Saks & Co., petition for cert.
filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3529 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1974) (No. 73-1289).
108 This was done by implication only, since the Menendez court expressly argued that
the act of state doctrine would apply to a foreign government's repudiation in any form
unless the controversy was brought before the court in the counterclaim context of First
National City Bank and was accompanied by a Bernstein letter. 485 F.2d at 1370, 1373.
109 See text accompanying note 126 infra.
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property by a state does not violate international law, the court
did not examine that particular act.'10 Its holding focused only
on the Cuban refusal to reimburse. But in denying the validity of
Cuba's actions, the court made no effort to determine whether
they violated principles of international law. Thus a broad read-
ing of the Menendez opinion supports the argument that the case
frees the First National City Bank exception to the act of state
doctrine from one of its fundamental underpinnings: that the
act of state being challenged in the litigation for which access to
the court is sought must violate international law."'
C. Additional Considerations
The newly expanded First National City Bank-Menendez ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine may offer the American
owner of a nationalized foreign oil concession hope, in certain
circumstances, of a substantial recovery through the courts.
Under the present state of the law, however, three essential limi-
tations on the availability of the exception to the act of state
doctrine emerge from First National City Bank: the act of state
must be in violation of international law;" 2 the State Depart-
ment must send a "Bernstein letter" informing the court that the
foreign policy needs of the United States do not necessitate ap-
plication of the doctrine; and the investor must frame the issue
of validity in the form of a counterclaim against a petitioning
foreign sovereign. Nevertheless, it is clear that, at a minimum,
the new judicial exceptions to the act of state doctrine allow for
the protection of a broader range of oil investors' interests than
does the Sabbatino Amendment." 3 The holding in Menendez, for
example, makes the exception applicable to claims based on both
strict breach theory and quasi-contractual causes of action."1
4
First National City Bank itself allowed the exception in a fact situa-
tion involving seizure of both physical assets and contractual
obligations. 115 The First National City Bank-Menendez exception
thus could allow a decision based on the merits adjudicating both
110 See, e.g., F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
affd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
"' See text accompanying notes 126-27 infra. A petition for certiorari filed by Cuba
to resolve this issue is pending before the Supreme Court. Republic of Cuba v. Saks &
Co., petition for cert.filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3529 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1974) (No. 73-1289).
11
2 But see text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.
113 See Carlston, Conversion Agreements and Nationalization, in SELECTED READINGS ON
PROTECTION By LAW OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 273 (1964); Leigh, supra note 7,
at 225.
114 485 F.2d 1355, 1372-74 (2d Cir. 1973).
15 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
1975)
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:610
the validity of a foreign sovereign's seizure of all physical assets
expropriated and the investors' rights under the nationalized or
repudiated concession agreement.
As a result of Justice Douglas' opinion in City Bank,1 16 the
critical issue in future litigation could well be the counterclaim
limitation." 7 But even assuming that an adjudication free of the
act of state doctrine can proceed only if the cause of action is
brought in a counterclaim context, the foreign investor may still
find circumstances in which substantial recoveries may be avail-
able. From this perspective, one goal of the oil investor should be
to posture himself in relationships in which property of various
Arab oil producing states is in the legal possession of the investor
or parties friendly to him. In the event of a nationalization, such
property may be converted. In any subsequent action by the
sovereign to recover that property, the losses resulting from the
nationalization may be counterclaimed.
While such an approach would have been highly unrealistic
a few years ago, there is now reason to believe thht sophisticated
"nationalization deterrence" planning may prove to be success-
ful. The.critical factor giving life to this alternative is the recent
expansion of interest among Arab states in investment in Ameri-
can enterprises and securities. Substantial sums of Arab money
are, in fact, already deposited in American banks." 8 The coun-
terclaim has thus become an increasingly valuable deterrent
force as the amount of American investment in Arab interests is
"collateralized" by Arab property in the United States which the
investor may seize without recourse to legal proceedings.
Ingenuity will be required to develop such interrelation-
ships. Joint ventures in American refining plants offer one ap-
proach. Assigning interests in Arab holdings to American banks
as security in other investor commercial activity will make possi-
ble actions in a third party intervenor capacity following a
nationalization if the bank holds Arab cash deposits which are set
off"19 and the Arab state contests the setoff in American courts.
Only Justice Douglas' opinion grafted the counterclaim require-
ment to the majority consensus in First National City Bank.'
20
Should the counterclaim requirement be read out, the investors'
116 See notes 99-100 supra & accompanying text.
117 For an example of a recent counterclaim of Texaco Overseas Petroleum Com-
pany arising out of the Libyan nationalization, see N.Y. Times, June 13, 1974, at 65, col.
1.
I18 Berton, Where is Arabian Oil Money Flowing?, FINANCIAL WORLD, Aug. 22, 1973, at
16; NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1974, at 54; TIME, Mar. 11, 1974, at 87.
""'For a discussion of the general theory of a bank's right to "set off" deposits
against matured debts, see Loyd, The Development of Set Off, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (1916).
2' See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
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potential remedy options could expand significantly. 121 The ag-
grieved American party could attach the nationalizing state's
property in the United States even though that property had no
direct relation to the claim. With the excision of the counterclaim
requirement, 'the "Bernstein letter" rationale could be elevated
from the dominant to the controlling principle for judicial
waiver of the act of state doctrine. 22 Even if direct actions would
be proper, any such suit based on in rem or quasi-in rem juris-
diction might be faced with a claim of sovereign immunity. 23
Because the factors involved in granting an exception to the act
of state doctrine and rejecting a foreign state's request for a
suggestion of immunity are logically indistinguishable, it would
be inconsistent for the Department to grant such a suggestion in
a case it had described as fit for exception from the doctrine.
This would then leave the issue of sovereign immunity to the
discretion of the court. It is not clear whether the executive's
immunity would be sufficient to reverse Victory Transport's
124
characterization of "acts of nationalization" as jure imperii (state
entitled to sovereign immunity). If no request for a suggestion
has been made, it is even less clear whether the court could draw
any inferences from or attach any presumptions to a letter from
the Department waiving the act of state doctrine. This is an area
of the law greatly in need of refinement in light of the increasing
121 See generally Harvard Note, supra note 86, at 142.
122 However, reading the counterclaim requirement out of the First National City
Bank case may not necessarily mean that the requirement would be eliminated in prac-
tice. In the Stevenson version of the "Bernstein letter" in First National City Bank, the
setoff requirement for jurisdiction and the amount of the counterclaim as a limit on the
recovery were both expressly incorporated as conditions on the State Department's sug-
gestion that application of the act of state doctrine was not required by the needs of
American foreign policy. This letter is reproduced in the Second Circuit's decision, 442
F.2d at 536-38. The archetypal "Bernstein letter" had no such limitation, but rather
stated in the broadest terms that it was the executive's policy "to relieve American courts
from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
acts of Nazi officials." 20 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 592 (1949). For some insights into the
thinking within the Department at the time, see Metzger, supra note 36, at 890 n.30.
It is noteworthy that the original "Bernstein letter" was written in reference to a
foreign governnfent not then extant and with which America was at war at the time of
the act in controversy. Whether either or both of these criteria would be conditions
precedent to the Department's writing a similar letter is a matter for political evaluation.
It is highly unlikely, though, that such a broad letter would be drafted, considering the
character of our contemporary foreign policy toward the Arab oil producing states. See,
e.g., President Nixon Visits Five Middle East Nations, 71 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 77 (1974).
123 See New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (property unrelated to claim was immune from foreign attachment). But
see Lowenfeld, supra note 71, at 908 (citing 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 709 (1968) (trend toward quasi-in rem jurisdiction being upheld where attachment is
merely for jurisdiction, not execution) ). See also text accompanying notes 64-73 supra.
124 Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
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levels of commercial investment in the United States by foreign
state trading and investment instrumentalities. To date, how-
ever, there is no reported federal case involving a defense of
sovereign immunity to a claim based on an attachment of prop-
erty unrelated to the specific controversy.'
25
Finally, should Menendez' apparent waiver of the need to
allege that the act of state whose validity is to be challenged is in
violation of some principle of international law be affirmed or
left undisturbed by the Supreme Court,12 6 the grounds on which
the nationalization could be attacked would be greatly expanded
and the number of controversies which would qualify for a hear-
ing might substantially increase. The difficulty of proving that
the nationalizing state did not meet an international minimum
standard in its actions may be significantly greater than, for ex-
ample, sustaining the posture that it was "unjustly enriched" at
the offered rate of compensation.'
2 7
III. CONCLUSION
Both the Sabbatino Amendment and the First National City
Bank-Menendez doctrine offer the oil investor expanding, but
still limited, access to American courts in his search for possible
remedies following a nationalization of foreign investments. If
further expanded to allow for attachment of unrelated property
in the United States of a commercial character owned by the
nationalizing state, the doctrine could have a significant deter-
rent effect on future Middle Eastern nationalizations. The Arab
states seeking outlets for foreign investment of accumulated cap-
ital are as interested as the American investor in the security of
their investments. Fair play would demand that if Arab invest-
ments are to be secure in the United States, American invest-
ments in the Middle East should be as protected. It appears that
the most direct way to guarantee this result would be to expand
the availability of both the commercial activity exception to the
sovereign immunity defense and the First National City
Bank-Menendez exception to the act of state doctrine. By so
doing, the nationalizing state could not, in the words of Justice
Douglas in First National City Bank, "have its cake and eat it
too."
12 8
1'5 Lowenfeld, supra note 71, at 924.
1
1
6 See Republic of Cuba v. Saks, petition for cert.filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3529 (U.S. Feb. 21,
1974) (No. 72-1289).
1217 Cf. Menendez v. Saks Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1370-74 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub
nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974) (No.
73-1288).
128 406 U.S. 759, 772 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring in the result).
